docker setup
This commit is contained in:
		| @ -0,0 +1,211 @@ | ||||
| """ | ||||
| Cache middleware. If enabled, each Django-powered page will be cached based on | ||||
| URL. The canonical way to enable cache middleware is to set | ||||
| ``UpdateCacheMiddleware`` as your first piece of middleware, and | ||||
| ``FetchFromCacheMiddleware`` as the last:: | ||||
|  | ||||
|     MIDDLEWARE = [ | ||||
|         'django.middleware.cache.UpdateCacheMiddleware', | ||||
|         ... | ||||
|         'django.middleware.cache.FetchFromCacheMiddleware' | ||||
|     ] | ||||
|  | ||||
| This is counter-intuitive, but correct: ``UpdateCacheMiddleware`` needs to run | ||||
| last during the response phase, which processes middleware bottom-up; | ||||
| ``FetchFromCacheMiddleware`` needs to run last during the request phase, which | ||||
| processes middleware top-down. | ||||
|  | ||||
| The single-class ``CacheMiddleware`` can be used for some simple sites. | ||||
| However, if any other piece of middleware needs to affect the cache key, you'll | ||||
| need to use the two-part ``UpdateCacheMiddleware`` and | ||||
| ``FetchFromCacheMiddleware``. This'll most often happen when you're using | ||||
| Django's ``LocaleMiddleware``. | ||||
|  | ||||
| More details about how the caching works: | ||||
|  | ||||
| * Only GET or HEAD-requests with status code 200 are cached. | ||||
|  | ||||
| * The number of seconds each page is stored for is set by the "max-age" section | ||||
|   of the response's "Cache-Control" header, falling back to the | ||||
|   CACHE_MIDDLEWARE_SECONDS setting if the section was not found. | ||||
|  | ||||
| * This middleware expects that a HEAD request is answered with the same response | ||||
|   headers exactly like the corresponding GET request. | ||||
|  | ||||
| * When a hit occurs, a shallow copy of the original response object is returned | ||||
|   from process_request. | ||||
|  | ||||
| * Pages will be cached based on the contents of the request headers listed in | ||||
|   the response's "Vary" header. | ||||
|  | ||||
| * This middleware also sets ETag, Last-Modified, Expires and Cache-Control | ||||
|   headers on the response object. | ||||
|  | ||||
| """ | ||||
|  | ||||
| from django.conf import settings | ||||
| from django.core.cache import DEFAULT_CACHE_ALIAS, caches | ||||
| from django.utils.cache import ( | ||||
|     get_cache_key, | ||||
|     get_max_age, | ||||
|     has_vary_header, | ||||
|     learn_cache_key, | ||||
|     patch_response_headers, | ||||
| ) | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class UpdateCacheMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Response-phase cache middleware that updates the cache if the response is | ||||
|     cacheable. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     Must be used as part of the two-part update/fetch cache middleware. | ||||
|     UpdateCacheMiddleware must be the first piece of middleware in MIDDLEWARE | ||||
|     so that it'll get called last during the response phase. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def __init__(self, get_response): | ||||
|         super().__init__(get_response) | ||||
|         self.cache_timeout = settings.CACHE_MIDDLEWARE_SECONDS | ||||
|         self.page_timeout = None | ||||
|         self.key_prefix = settings.CACHE_MIDDLEWARE_KEY_PREFIX | ||||
|         self.cache_alias = settings.CACHE_MIDDLEWARE_ALIAS | ||||
|  | ||||
|     @property | ||||
|     def cache(self): | ||||
|         return caches[self.cache_alias] | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _should_update_cache(self, request, response): | ||||
|         return hasattr(request, "_cache_update_cache") and request._cache_update_cache | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         """Set the cache, if needed.""" | ||||
|         if not self._should_update_cache(request, response): | ||||
|             # We don't need to update the cache, just return. | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if response.streaming or response.status_code not in (200, 304): | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Don't cache responses that set a user-specific (and maybe security | ||||
|         # sensitive) cookie in response to a cookie-less request. | ||||
|         if ( | ||||
|             not request.COOKIES | ||||
|             and response.cookies | ||||
|             and has_vary_header(response, "Cookie") | ||||
|         ): | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Don't cache a response with 'Cache-Control: private' | ||||
|         if "private" in response.get("Cache-Control", ()): | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Page timeout takes precedence over the "max-age" and the default | ||||
|         # cache timeout. | ||||
|         timeout = self.page_timeout | ||||
|         if timeout is None: | ||||
|             # The timeout from the "max-age" section of the "Cache-Control" | ||||
|             # header takes precedence over the default cache timeout. | ||||
|             timeout = get_max_age(response) | ||||
|             if timeout is None: | ||||
|                 timeout = self.cache_timeout | ||||
|             elif timeout == 0: | ||||
|                 # max-age was set to 0, don't cache. | ||||
|                 return response | ||||
|         patch_response_headers(response, timeout) | ||||
|         if timeout and response.status_code == 200: | ||||
|             cache_key = learn_cache_key( | ||||
|                 request, response, timeout, self.key_prefix, cache=self.cache | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|             if hasattr(response, "render") and callable(response.render): | ||||
|                 response.add_post_render_callback( | ||||
|                     lambda r: self.cache.set(cache_key, r, timeout) | ||||
|                 ) | ||||
|             else: | ||||
|                 self.cache.set(cache_key, response, timeout) | ||||
|         return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class FetchFromCacheMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Request-phase cache middleware that fetches a page from the cache. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     Must be used as part of the two-part update/fetch cache middleware. | ||||
|     FetchFromCacheMiddleware must be the last piece of middleware in MIDDLEWARE | ||||
|     so that it'll get called last during the request phase. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def __init__(self, get_response): | ||||
|         super().__init__(get_response) | ||||
|         self.key_prefix = settings.CACHE_MIDDLEWARE_KEY_PREFIX | ||||
|         self.cache_alias = settings.CACHE_MIDDLEWARE_ALIAS | ||||
|  | ||||
|     @property | ||||
|     def cache(self): | ||||
|         return caches[self.cache_alias] | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_request(self, request): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Check whether the page is already cached and return the cached | ||||
|         version if available. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         if request.method not in ("GET", "HEAD"): | ||||
|             request._cache_update_cache = False | ||||
|             return None  # Don't bother checking the cache. | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # try and get the cached GET response | ||||
|         cache_key = get_cache_key(request, self.key_prefix, "GET", cache=self.cache) | ||||
|         if cache_key is None: | ||||
|             request._cache_update_cache = True | ||||
|             return None  # No cache information available, need to rebuild. | ||||
|         response = self.cache.get(cache_key) | ||||
|         # if it wasn't found and we are looking for a HEAD, try looking just for that | ||||
|         if response is None and request.method == "HEAD": | ||||
|             cache_key = get_cache_key( | ||||
|                 request, self.key_prefix, "HEAD", cache=self.cache | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|             response = self.cache.get(cache_key) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if response is None: | ||||
|             request._cache_update_cache = True | ||||
|             return None  # No cache information available, need to rebuild. | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # hit, return cached response | ||||
|         request._cache_update_cache = False | ||||
|         return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class CacheMiddleware(UpdateCacheMiddleware, FetchFromCacheMiddleware): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Cache middleware that provides basic behavior for many simple sites. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     Also used as the hook point for the cache decorator, which is generated | ||||
|     using the decorator-from-middleware utility. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def __init__(self, get_response, cache_timeout=None, page_timeout=None, **kwargs): | ||||
|         super().__init__(get_response) | ||||
|         # We need to differentiate between "provided, but using default value", | ||||
|         # and "not provided". If the value is provided using a default, then | ||||
|         # we fall back to system defaults. If it is not provided at all, | ||||
|         # we need to use middleware defaults. | ||||
|  | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             key_prefix = kwargs["key_prefix"] | ||||
|             if key_prefix is None: | ||||
|                 key_prefix = "" | ||||
|             self.key_prefix = key_prefix | ||||
|         except KeyError: | ||||
|             pass | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             cache_alias = kwargs["cache_alias"] | ||||
|             if cache_alias is None: | ||||
|                 cache_alias = DEFAULT_CACHE_ALIAS | ||||
|             self.cache_alias = cache_alias | ||||
|         except KeyError: | ||||
|             pass | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if cache_timeout is not None: | ||||
|             self.cache_timeout = cache_timeout | ||||
|         self.page_timeout = page_timeout | ||||
| @ -0,0 +1,48 @@ | ||||
| """ | ||||
| Clickjacking Protection Middleware. | ||||
|  | ||||
| This module provides a middleware that implements protection against a | ||||
| malicious site loading resources from your site in a hidden frame. | ||||
| """ | ||||
|  | ||||
| from django.conf import settings | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class XFrameOptionsMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Set the X-Frame-Options HTTP header in HTTP responses. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     Do not set the header if it's already set or if the response contains | ||||
|     a xframe_options_exempt value set to True. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     By default, set the X-Frame-Options header to 'DENY', meaning the response | ||||
|     cannot be displayed in a frame, regardless of the site attempting to do so. | ||||
|     To enable the response to be loaded on a frame within the same site, set | ||||
|     X_FRAME_OPTIONS in your project's Django settings to 'SAMEORIGIN'. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         # Don't set it if it's already in the response | ||||
|         if response.get("X-Frame-Options") is not None: | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Don't set it if they used @xframe_options_exempt | ||||
|         if getattr(response, "xframe_options_exempt", False): | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         response.headers["X-Frame-Options"] = self.get_xframe_options_value( | ||||
|             request, | ||||
|             response, | ||||
|         ) | ||||
|         return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def get_xframe_options_value(self, request, response): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Get the value to set for the X_FRAME_OPTIONS header. Use the value from | ||||
|         the X_FRAME_OPTIONS setting, or 'DENY' if not set. | ||||
|  | ||||
|         This method can be overridden if needed, allowing it to vary based on | ||||
|         the request or response. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         return getattr(settings, "X_FRAME_OPTIONS", "DENY").upper() | ||||
| @ -0,0 +1,178 @@ | ||||
| import re | ||||
| from urllib.parse import urlparse | ||||
|  | ||||
| from django.conf import settings | ||||
| from django.core.exceptions import PermissionDenied | ||||
| from django.core.mail import mail_managers | ||||
| from django.http import HttpResponsePermanentRedirect | ||||
| from django.urls import is_valid_path | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
| from django.utils.http import escape_leading_slashes | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class CommonMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     "Common" middleware for taking care of some basic operations: | ||||
|  | ||||
|         - Forbid access to User-Agents in settings.DISALLOWED_USER_AGENTS | ||||
|  | ||||
|         - URL rewriting: Based on the APPEND_SLASH and PREPEND_WWW settings, | ||||
|           append missing slashes and/or prepends missing "www."s. | ||||
|  | ||||
|             - If APPEND_SLASH is set and the initial URL doesn't end with a | ||||
|               slash, and it is not found in urlpatterns, form a new URL by | ||||
|               appending a slash at the end. If this new URL is found in | ||||
|               urlpatterns, return an HTTP redirect to this new URL; otherwise | ||||
|               process the initial URL as usual. | ||||
|  | ||||
|           This behavior can be customized by subclassing CommonMiddleware and | ||||
|           overriding the response_redirect_class attribute. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     response_redirect_class = HttpResponsePermanentRedirect | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_request(self, request): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Check for denied User-Agents and rewrite the URL based on | ||||
|         settings.APPEND_SLASH and settings.PREPEND_WWW | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Check for denied User-Agents | ||||
|         user_agent = request.META.get("HTTP_USER_AGENT") | ||||
|         if user_agent is not None: | ||||
|             for user_agent_regex in settings.DISALLOWED_USER_AGENTS: | ||||
|                 if user_agent_regex.search(user_agent): | ||||
|                     raise PermissionDenied("Forbidden user agent") | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Check for a redirect based on settings.PREPEND_WWW | ||||
|         host = request.get_host() | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if settings.PREPEND_WWW and host and not host.startswith("www."): | ||||
|             # Check if we also need to append a slash so we can do it all | ||||
|             # with a single redirect. (This check may be somewhat expensive, | ||||
|             # so we only do it if we already know we're sending a redirect, | ||||
|             # or in process_response if we get a 404.) | ||||
|             if self.should_redirect_with_slash(request): | ||||
|                 path = self.get_full_path_with_slash(request) | ||||
|             else: | ||||
|                 path = request.get_full_path() | ||||
|  | ||||
|             return self.response_redirect_class(f"{request.scheme}://www.{host}{path}") | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def should_redirect_with_slash(self, request): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Return True if settings.APPEND_SLASH is True and appending a slash to | ||||
|         the request path turns an invalid path into a valid one. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         if settings.APPEND_SLASH and not request.path_info.endswith("/"): | ||||
|             urlconf = getattr(request, "urlconf", None) | ||||
|             if not is_valid_path(request.path_info, urlconf): | ||||
|                 match = is_valid_path("%s/" % request.path_info, urlconf) | ||||
|                 if match: | ||||
|                     view = match.func | ||||
|                     return getattr(view, "should_append_slash", True) | ||||
|         return False | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def get_full_path_with_slash(self, request): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Return the full path of the request with a trailing slash appended. | ||||
|  | ||||
|         Raise a RuntimeError if settings.DEBUG is True and request.method is | ||||
|         POST, PUT, or PATCH. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         new_path = request.get_full_path(force_append_slash=True) | ||||
|         # Prevent construction of scheme relative urls. | ||||
|         new_path = escape_leading_slashes(new_path) | ||||
|         if settings.DEBUG and request.method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH"): | ||||
|             raise RuntimeError( | ||||
|                 "You called this URL via %(method)s, but the URL doesn't end " | ||||
|                 "in a slash and you have APPEND_SLASH set. Django can't " | ||||
|                 "redirect to the slash URL while maintaining %(method)s data. " | ||||
|                 "Change your form to point to %(url)s (note the trailing " | ||||
|                 "slash), or set APPEND_SLASH=False in your Django settings." | ||||
|                 % { | ||||
|                     "method": request.method, | ||||
|                     "url": request.get_host() + new_path, | ||||
|                 } | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|         return new_path | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         When the status code of the response is 404, it may redirect to a path | ||||
|         with an appended slash if should_redirect_with_slash() returns True. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         # If the given URL is "Not Found", then check if we should redirect to | ||||
|         # a path with a slash appended. | ||||
|         if response.status_code == 404 and self.should_redirect_with_slash(request): | ||||
|             return self.response_redirect_class(self.get_full_path_with_slash(request)) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Add the Content-Length header to non-streaming responses if not | ||||
|         # already set. | ||||
|         if not response.streaming and not response.has_header("Content-Length"): | ||||
|             response.headers["Content-Length"] = str(len(response.content)) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class BrokenLinkEmailsMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         """Send broken link emails for relevant 404 NOT FOUND responses.""" | ||||
|         if response.status_code == 404 and not settings.DEBUG: | ||||
|             domain = request.get_host() | ||||
|             path = request.get_full_path() | ||||
|             referer = request.META.get("HTTP_REFERER", "") | ||||
|  | ||||
|             if not self.is_ignorable_request(request, path, domain, referer): | ||||
|                 ua = request.META.get("HTTP_USER_AGENT", "<none>") | ||||
|                 ip = request.META.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "<none>") | ||||
|                 mail_managers( | ||||
|                     "Broken %slink on %s" | ||||
|                     % ( | ||||
|                         ( | ||||
|                             "INTERNAL " | ||||
|                             if self.is_internal_request(domain, referer) | ||||
|                             else "" | ||||
|                         ), | ||||
|                         domain, | ||||
|                     ), | ||||
|                     "Referrer: %s\nRequested URL: %s\nUser agent: %s\n" | ||||
|                     "IP address: %s\n" % (referer, path, ua, ip), | ||||
|                     fail_silently=True, | ||||
|                 ) | ||||
|         return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def is_internal_request(self, domain, referer): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Return True if the referring URL is the same domain as the current | ||||
|         request. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         # Different subdomains are treated as different domains. | ||||
|         return bool(re.match("^https?://%s/" % re.escape(domain), referer)) | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def is_ignorable_request(self, request, uri, domain, referer): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Return True if the given request *shouldn't* notify the site managers | ||||
|         according to project settings or in situations outlined by the inline | ||||
|         comments. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         # The referer is empty. | ||||
|         if not referer: | ||||
|             return True | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # APPEND_SLASH is enabled and the referer is equal to the current URL | ||||
|         # without a trailing slash indicating an internal redirect. | ||||
|         if settings.APPEND_SLASH and uri.endswith("/") and referer == uri[:-1]: | ||||
|             return True | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # A '?' in referer is identified as a search engine source. | ||||
|         if not self.is_internal_request(domain, referer) and "?" in referer: | ||||
|             return True | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # The referer is equal to the current URL, ignoring the scheme (assumed | ||||
|         # to be a poorly implemented bot). | ||||
|         parsed_referer = urlparse(referer) | ||||
|         if parsed_referer.netloc in ["", domain] and parsed_referer.path == uri: | ||||
|             return True | ||||
|  | ||||
|         return any(pattern.search(uri) for pattern in settings.IGNORABLE_404_URLS) | ||||
| @ -0,0 +1,488 @@ | ||||
| """ | ||||
| Cross Site Request Forgery Middleware. | ||||
|  | ||||
| This module provides a middleware that implements protection | ||||
| against request forgeries from other sites. | ||||
| """ | ||||
| import logging | ||||
| import string | ||||
| from collections import defaultdict | ||||
| from urllib.parse import urlparse | ||||
|  | ||||
| from django.conf import settings | ||||
| from django.core.exceptions import DisallowedHost, ImproperlyConfigured | ||||
| from django.http import HttpHeaders, UnreadablePostError | ||||
| from django.urls import get_callable | ||||
| from django.utils.cache import patch_vary_headers | ||||
| from django.utils.crypto import constant_time_compare, get_random_string | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
| from django.utils.functional import cached_property | ||||
| from django.utils.http import is_same_domain | ||||
| from django.utils.log import log_response | ||||
| from django.utils.regex_helper import _lazy_re_compile | ||||
|  | ||||
| logger = logging.getLogger("django.security.csrf") | ||||
| # This matches if any character is not in CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS. | ||||
| invalid_token_chars_re = _lazy_re_compile("[^a-zA-Z0-9]") | ||||
|  | ||||
| REASON_BAD_ORIGIN = "Origin checking failed - %s does not match any trusted origins." | ||||
| REASON_NO_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - no Referer." | ||||
| REASON_BAD_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - %s does not match any trusted origins." | ||||
| REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE = "CSRF cookie not set." | ||||
| REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING = "CSRF token missing." | ||||
| REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - Referer is malformed." | ||||
| REASON_INSECURE_REFERER = ( | ||||
|     "Referer checking failed - Referer is insecure while host is secure." | ||||
| ) | ||||
| # The reason strings below are for passing to InvalidTokenFormat. They are | ||||
| # phrases without a subject because they can be in reference to either the CSRF | ||||
| # cookie or non-cookie token. | ||||
| REASON_INCORRECT_LENGTH = "has incorrect length" | ||||
| REASON_INVALID_CHARACTERS = "has invalid characters" | ||||
|  | ||||
| CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH = 32 | ||||
| CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH = 2 * CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH | ||||
| CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS = string.ascii_letters + string.digits | ||||
| CSRF_SESSION_KEY = "_csrftoken" | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def _get_failure_view(): | ||||
|     """Return the view to be used for CSRF rejections.""" | ||||
|     return get_callable(settings.CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW) | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def _get_new_csrf_string(): | ||||
|     return get_random_string(CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH, allowed_chars=CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS) | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def _mask_cipher_secret(secret): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Given a secret (assumed to be a string of CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS), generate a | ||||
|     token by adding a mask and applying it to the secret. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     mask = _get_new_csrf_string() | ||||
|     chars = CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS | ||||
|     pairs = zip((chars.index(x) for x in secret), (chars.index(x) for x in mask)) | ||||
|     cipher = "".join(chars[(x + y) % len(chars)] for x, y in pairs) | ||||
|     return mask + cipher | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def _unmask_cipher_token(token): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Given a token (assumed to be a string of CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS, of length | ||||
|     CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, and that its first half is a mask), use it to decrypt | ||||
|     the second half to produce the original secret. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     mask = token[:CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH] | ||||
|     token = token[CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH:] | ||||
|     chars = CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS | ||||
|     pairs = zip((chars.index(x) for x in token), (chars.index(x) for x in mask)) | ||||
|     return "".join(chars[x - y] for x, y in pairs)  # Note negative values are ok | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def _add_new_csrf_cookie(request): | ||||
|     """Generate a new random CSRF_COOKIE value, and add it to request.META.""" | ||||
|     csrf_secret = _get_new_csrf_string() | ||||
|     request.META.update( | ||||
|         { | ||||
|             # RemovedInDjango50Warning: when the deprecation ends, replace | ||||
|             # with: 'CSRF_COOKIE': csrf_secret | ||||
|             "CSRF_COOKIE": ( | ||||
|                 _mask_cipher_secret(csrf_secret) | ||||
|                 if settings.CSRF_COOKIE_MASKED | ||||
|                 else csrf_secret | ||||
|             ), | ||||
|             "CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE": True, | ||||
|         } | ||||
|     ) | ||||
|     return csrf_secret | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def get_token(request): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Return the CSRF token required for a POST form. The token is an | ||||
|     alphanumeric value. A new token is created if one is not already set. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     A side effect of calling this function is to make the csrf_protect | ||||
|     decorator and the CsrfViewMiddleware add a CSRF cookie and a 'Vary: Cookie' | ||||
|     header to the outgoing response.  For this reason, you may need to use this | ||||
|     function lazily, as is done by the csrf context processor. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     if "CSRF_COOKIE" in request.META: | ||||
|         csrf_secret = request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] | ||||
|         # Since the cookie is being used, flag to send the cookie in | ||||
|         # process_response() (even if the client already has it) in order to | ||||
|         # renew the expiry timer. | ||||
|         request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"] = True | ||||
|     else: | ||||
|         csrf_secret = _add_new_csrf_cookie(request) | ||||
|     return _mask_cipher_secret(csrf_secret) | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def rotate_token(request): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Change the CSRF token in use for a request - should be done on login | ||||
|     for security purposes. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     _add_new_csrf_cookie(request) | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class InvalidTokenFormat(Exception): | ||||
|     def __init__(self, reason): | ||||
|         self.reason = reason | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def _check_token_format(token): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Raise an InvalidTokenFormat error if the token has an invalid length or | ||||
|     characters that aren't allowed. The token argument can be a CSRF cookie | ||||
|     secret or non-cookie CSRF token, and either masked or unmasked. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     if len(token) not in (CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH): | ||||
|         raise InvalidTokenFormat(REASON_INCORRECT_LENGTH) | ||||
|     # Make sure all characters are in CSRF_ALLOWED_CHARS. | ||||
|     if invalid_token_chars_re.search(token): | ||||
|         raise InvalidTokenFormat(REASON_INVALID_CHARACTERS) | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| def _does_token_match(request_csrf_token, csrf_secret): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Return whether the given CSRF token matches the given CSRF secret, after | ||||
|     unmasking the token if necessary. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     This function assumes that the request_csrf_token argument has been | ||||
|     validated to have the correct length (CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH or | ||||
|     CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH characters) and allowed characters, and that if it has | ||||
|     length CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, it is a masked secret. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     # Only unmask tokens that are exactly CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH characters long. | ||||
|     if len(request_csrf_token) == CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH: | ||||
|         request_csrf_token = _unmask_cipher_token(request_csrf_token) | ||||
|     assert len(request_csrf_token) == CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH | ||||
|     return constant_time_compare(request_csrf_token, csrf_secret) | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class RejectRequest(Exception): | ||||
|     def __init__(self, reason): | ||||
|         self.reason = reason | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class CsrfViewMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Require a present and correct csrfmiddlewaretoken for POST requests that | ||||
|     have a CSRF cookie, and set an outgoing CSRF cookie. | ||||
|  | ||||
|     This middleware should be used in conjunction with the {% csrf_token %} | ||||
|     template tag. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     @cached_property | ||||
|     def csrf_trusted_origins_hosts(self): | ||||
|         return [ | ||||
|             urlparse(origin).netloc.lstrip("*") | ||||
|             for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS | ||||
|         ] | ||||
|  | ||||
|     @cached_property | ||||
|     def allowed_origins_exact(self): | ||||
|         return {origin for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS if "*" not in origin} | ||||
|  | ||||
|     @cached_property | ||||
|     def allowed_origin_subdomains(self): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         A mapping of allowed schemes to list of allowed netlocs, where all | ||||
|         subdomains of the netloc are allowed. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         allowed_origin_subdomains = defaultdict(list) | ||||
|         for parsed in ( | ||||
|             urlparse(origin) | ||||
|             for origin in settings.CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS | ||||
|             if "*" in origin | ||||
|         ): | ||||
|             allowed_origin_subdomains[parsed.scheme].append(parsed.netloc.lstrip("*")) | ||||
|         return allowed_origin_subdomains | ||||
|  | ||||
|     # The _accept and _reject methods currently only exist for the sake of the | ||||
|     # requires_csrf_token decorator. | ||||
|     def _accept(self, request): | ||||
|         # Avoid checking the request twice by adding a custom attribute to | ||||
|         # request.  This will be relevant when both decorator and middleware | ||||
|         # are used. | ||||
|         request.csrf_processing_done = True | ||||
|         return None | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _reject(self, request, reason): | ||||
|         response = _get_failure_view()(request, reason=reason) | ||||
|         log_response( | ||||
|             "Forbidden (%s): %s", | ||||
|             reason, | ||||
|             request.path, | ||||
|             response=response, | ||||
|             request=request, | ||||
|             logger=logger, | ||||
|         ) | ||||
|         return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _get_secret(self, request): | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         Return the CSRF secret originally associated with the request, or None | ||||
|         if it didn't have one. | ||||
|  | ||||
|         If the CSRF_USE_SESSIONS setting is false, raises InvalidTokenFormat if | ||||
|         the request's secret has invalid characters or an invalid length. | ||||
|         """ | ||||
|         if settings.CSRF_USE_SESSIONS: | ||||
|             try: | ||||
|                 csrf_secret = request.session.get(CSRF_SESSION_KEY) | ||||
|             except AttributeError: | ||||
|                 raise ImproperlyConfigured( | ||||
|                     "CSRF_USE_SESSIONS is enabled, but request.session is not " | ||||
|                     "set. SessionMiddleware must appear before CsrfViewMiddleware " | ||||
|                     "in MIDDLEWARE." | ||||
|                 ) | ||||
|         else: | ||||
|             try: | ||||
|                 csrf_secret = request.COOKIES[settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME] | ||||
|             except KeyError: | ||||
|                 csrf_secret = None | ||||
|             else: | ||||
|                 # This can raise InvalidTokenFormat. | ||||
|                 _check_token_format(csrf_secret) | ||||
|         if csrf_secret is None: | ||||
|             return None | ||||
|         # Django versions before 4.0 masked the secret before storing. | ||||
|         if len(csrf_secret) == CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH: | ||||
|             csrf_secret = _unmask_cipher_token(csrf_secret) | ||||
|         return csrf_secret | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _set_csrf_cookie(self, request, response): | ||||
|         if settings.CSRF_USE_SESSIONS: | ||||
|             if request.session.get(CSRF_SESSION_KEY) != request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"]: | ||||
|                 request.session[CSRF_SESSION_KEY] = request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] | ||||
|         else: | ||||
|             response.set_cookie( | ||||
|                 settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, | ||||
|                 request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"], | ||||
|                 max_age=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_AGE, | ||||
|                 domain=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN, | ||||
|                 path=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_PATH, | ||||
|                 secure=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE, | ||||
|                 httponly=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY, | ||||
|                 samesite=settings.CSRF_COOKIE_SAMESITE, | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|             # Set the Vary header since content varies with the CSRF cookie. | ||||
|             patch_vary_headers(response, ("Cookie",)) | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _origin_verified(self, request): | ||||
|         request_origin = request.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             good_host = request.get_host() | ||||
|         except DisallowedHost: | ||||
|             pass | ||||
|         else: | ||||
|             good_origin = "%s://%s" % ( | ||||
|                 "https" if request.is_secure() else "http", | ||||
|                 good_host, | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|             if request_origin == good_origin: | ||||
|                 return True | ||||
|         if request_origin in self.allowed_origins_exact: | ||||
|             return True | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             parsed_origin = urlparse(request_origin) | ||||
|         except ValueError: | ||||
|             return False | ||||
|         request_scheme = parsed_origin.scheme | ||||
|         request_netloc = parsed_origin.netloc | ||||
|         return any( | ||||
|             is_same_domain(request_netloc, host) | ||||
|             for host in self.allowed_origin_subdomains.get(request_scheme, ()) | ||||
|         ) | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _check_referer(self, request): | ||||
|         referer = request.META.get("HTTP_REFERER") | ||||
|         if referer is None: | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(REASON_NO_REFERER) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             referer = urlparse(referer) | ||||
|         except ValueError: | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Make sure we have a valid URL for Referer. | ||||
|         if "" in (referer.scheme, referer.netloc): | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(REASON_MALFORMED_REFERER) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Ensure that our Referer is also secure. | ||||
|         if referer.scheme != "https": | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(REASON_INSECURE_REFERER) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if any( | ||||
|             is_same_domain(referer.netloc, host) | ||||
|             for host in self.csrf_trusted_origins_hosts | ||||
|         ): | ||||
|             return | ||||
|         # Allow matching the configured cookie domain. | ||||
|         good_referer = ( | ||||
|             settings.SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN | ||||
|             if settings.CSRF_USE_SESSIONS | ||||
|             else settings.CSRF_COOKIE_DOMAIN | ||||
|         ) | ||||
|         if good_referer is None: | ||||
|             # If no cookie domain is configured, allow matching the current | ||||
|             # host:port exactly if it's permitted by ALLOWED_HOSTS. | ||||
|             try: | ||||
|                 # request.get_host() includes the port. | ||||
|                 good_referer = request.get_host() | ||||
|             except DisallowedHost: | ||||
|                 raise RejectRequest(REASON_BAD_REFERER % referer.geturl()) | ||||
|         else: | ||||
|             server_port = request.get_port() | ||||
|             if server_port not in ("443", "80"): | ||||
|                 good_referer = "%s:%s" % (good_referer, server_port) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if not is_same_domain(referer.netloc, good_referer): | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(REASON_BAD_REFERER % referer.geturl()) | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _bad_token_message(self, reason, token_source): | ||||
|         if token_source != "POST": | ||||
|             # Assume it is a settings.CSRF_HEADER_NAME value. | ||||
|             header_name = HttpHeaders.parse_header_name(token_source) | ||||
|             token_source = f"the {header_name!r} HTTP header" | ||||
|         return f"CSRF token from {token_source} {reason}." | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def _check_token(self, request): | ||||
|         # Access csrf_secret via self._get_secret() as rotate_token() may have | ||||
|         # been called by an authentication middleware during the | ||||
|         # process_request() phase. | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             csrf_secret = self._get_secret(request) | ||||
|         except InvalidTokenFormat as exc: | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(f"CSRF cookie {exc.reason}.") | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if csrf_secret is None: | ||||
|             # No CSRF cookie. For POST requests, we insist on a CSRF cookie, | ||||
|             # and in this way we can avoid all CSRF attacks, including login | ||||
|             # CSRF. | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Check non-cookie token for match. | ||||
|         request_csrf_token = "" | ||||
|         if request.method == "POST": | ||||
|             try: | ||||
|                 request_csrf_token = request.POST.get("csrfmiddlewaretoken", "") | ||||
|             except UnreadablePostError: | ||||
|                 # Handle a broken connection before we've completed reading the | ||||
|                 # POST data. process_view shouldn't raise any exceptions, so | ||||
|                 # we'll ignore and serve the user a 403 (assuming they're still | ||||
|                 # listening, which they probably aren't because of the error). | ||||
|                 pass | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if request_csrf_token == "": | ||||
|             # Fall back to X-CSRFToken, to make things easier for AJAX, and | ||||
|             # possible for PUT/DELETE. | ||||
|             try: | ||||
|                 # This can have length CSRF_SECRET_LENGTH or CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH, | ||||
|                 # depending on whether the client obtained the token from | ||||
|                 # the DOM or the cookie (and if the cookie, whether the cookie | ||||
|                 # was masked or unmasked). | ||||
|                 request_csrf_token = request.META[settings.CSRF_HEADER_NAME] | ||||
|             except KeyError: | ||||
|                 raise RejectRequest(REASON_CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING) | ||||
|             token_source = settings.CSRF_HEADER_NAME | ||||
|         else: | ||||
|             token_source = "POST" | ||||
|  | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             _check_token_format(request_csrf_token) | ||||
|         except InvalidTokenFormat as exc: | ||||
|             reason = self._bad_token_message(exc.reason, token_source) | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(reason) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if not _does_token_match(request_csrf_token, csrf_secret): | ||||
|             reason = self._bad_token_message("incorrect", token_source) | ||||
|             raise RejectRequest(reason) | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_request(self, request): | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             csrf_secret = self._get_secret(request) | ||||
|         except InvalidTokenFormat: | ||||
|             _add_new_csrf_cookie(request) | ||||
|         else: | ||||
|             if csrf_secret is not None: | ||||
|                 # Use the same secret next time. If the secret was originally | ||||
|                 # masked, this also causes it to be replaced with the unmasked | ||||
|                 # form, but only in cases where the secret is already getting | ||||
|                 # saved anyways. | ||||
|                 request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] = csrf_secret | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_view(self, request, callback, callback_args, callback_kwargs): | ||||
|         if getattr(request, "csrf_processing_done", False): | ||||
|             return None | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Wait until request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] has been manipulated before | ||||
|         # bailing out, so that get_token still works | ||||
|         if getattr(callback, "csrf_exempt", False): | ||||
|             return None | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Assume that anything not defined as 'safe' by RFC 9110 needs protection | ||||
|         if request.method in ("GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "TRACE"): | ||||
|             return self._accept(request) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if getattr(request, "_dont_enforce_csrf_checks", False): | ||||
|             # Mechanism to turn off CSRF checks for test suite. It comes after | ||||
|             # the creation of CSRF cookies, so that everything else continues | ||||
|             # to work exactly the same (e.g. cookies are sent, etc.), but | ||||
|             # before any branches that call the _reject method. | ||||
|             return self._accept(request) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Reject the request if the Origin header doesn't match an allowed | ||||
|         # value. | ||||
|         if "HTTP_ORIGIN" in request.META: | ||||
|             if not self._origin_verified(request): | ||||
|                 return self._reject( | ||||
|                     request, REASON_BAD_ORIGIN % request.META["HTTP_ORIGIN"] | ||||
|                 ) | ||||
|         elif request.is_secure(): | ||||
|             # If the Origin header wasn't provided, reject HTTPS requests if | ||||
|             # the Referer header doesn't match an allowed value. | ||||
|             # | ||||
|             # Suppose user visits http://example.com/ | ||||
|             # An active network attacker (man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a | ||||
|             # POST form that targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and | ||||
|             # submits it via JavaScript. | ||||
|             # | ||||
|             # The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but | ||||
|             # that's no problem for a MITM and the session-independent secret | ||||
|             # we're using. So the MITM can circumvent the CSRF protection. This | ||||
|             # is true for any HTTP connection, but anyone using HTTPS expects | ||||
|             # better! For this reason, for https://example.com/ we need | ||||
|             # additional protection that treats http://example.com/ as | ||||
|             # completely untrusted. Under HTTPS, Barth et al. found that the | ||||
|             # Referer header is missing for same-domain requests in only about | ||||
|             # 0.2% of cases or less, so we can use strict Referer checking. | ||||
|             try: | ||||
|                 self._check_referer(request) | ||||
|             except RejectRequest as exc: | ||||
|                 return self._reject(request, exc.reason) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         try: | ||||
|             self._check_token(request) | ||||
|         except RejectRequest as exc: | ||||
|             return self._reject(request, exc.reason) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         return self._accept(request) | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         if request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"): | ||||
|             self._set_csrf_cookie(request, response) | ||||
|             # Unset the flag to prevent _set_csrf_cookie() from being | ||||
|             # unnecessarily called again in process_response() by other | ||||
|             # instances of CsrfViewMiddleware. This can happen e.g. when both a | ||||
|             # decorator and middleware are used. However, | ||||
|             # CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE is still respected in subsequent calls | ||||
|             # e.g. in case rotate_token() is called in process_response() later | ||||
|             # by custom middleware but before those subsequent calls. | ||||
|             request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_NEEDS_UPDATE"] = False | ||||
|  | ||||
|         return response | ||||
| @ -0,0 +1,74 @@ | ||||
| from django.utils.cache import patch_vary_headers | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
| from django.utils.regex_helper import _lazy_re_compile | ||||
| from django.utils.text import compress_sequence, compress_string | ||||
|  | ||||
| re_accepts_gzip = _lazy_re_compile(r"\bgzip\b") | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class GZipMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Compress content if the browser allows gzip compression. | ||||
|     Set the Vary header accordingly, so that caches will base their storage | ||||
|     on the Accept-Encoding header. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     max_random_bytes = 100 | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         # It's not worth attempting to compress really short responses. | ||||
|         if not response.streaming and len(response.content) < 200: | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # Avoid gzipping if we've already got a content-encoding. | ||||
|         if response.has_header("Content-Encoding"): | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         patch_vary_headers(response, ("Accept-Encoding",)) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         ae = request.META.get("HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING", "") | ||||
|         if not re_accepts_gzip.search(ae): | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if response.streaming: | ||||
|             if response.is_async: | ||||
|                 # pull to lexical scope to capture fixed reference in case | ||||
|                 # streaming_content is set again later. | ||||
|                 orignal_iterator = response.streaming_content | ||||
|  | ||||
|                 async def gzip_wrapper(): | ||||
|                     async for chunk in orignal_iterator: | ||||
|                         yield compress_string( | ||||
|                             chunk, | ||||
|                             max_random_bytes=self.max_random_bytes, | ||||
|                         ) | ||||
|  | ||||
|                 response.streaming_content = gzip_wrapper() | ||||
|             else: | ||||
|                 response.streaming_content = compress_sequence( | ||||
|                     response.streaming_content, | ||||
|                     max_random_bytes=self.max_random_bytes, | ||||
|                 ) | ||||
|             # Delete the `Content-Length` header for streaming content, because | ||||
|             # we won't know the compressed size until we stream it. | ||||
|             del response.headers["Content-Length"] | ||||
|         else: | ||||
|             # Return the compressed content only if it's actually shorter. | ||||
|             compressed_content = compress_string( | ||||
|                 response.content, | ||||
|                 max_random_bytes=self.max_random_bytes, | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|             if len(compressed_content) >= len(response.content): | ||||
|                 return response | ||||
|             response.content = compressed_content | ||||
|             response.headers["Content-Length"] = str(len(response.content)) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         # If there is a strong ETag, make it weak to fulfill the requirements | ||||
|         # of RFC 9110 Section 8.8.1 while also allowing conditional request | ||||
|         # matches on ETags. | ||||
|         etag = response.get("ETag") | ||||
|         if etag and etag.startswith('"'): | ||||
|             response.headers["ETag"] = "W/" + etag | ||||
|         response.headers["Content-Encoding"] = "gzip" | ||||
|  | ||||
|         return response | ||||
| @ -0,0 +1,40 @@ | ||||
| from django.utils.cache import cc_delim_re, get_conditional_response, set_response_etag | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
| from django.utils.http import parse_http_date_safe | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class ConditionalGetMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Handle conditional GET operations. If the response has an ETag or | ||||
|     Last-Modified header and the request has If-None-Match or If-Modified-Since, | ||||
|     replace the response with HttpNotModified. Add an ETag header if needed. | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         # It's too late to prevent an unsafe request with a 412 response, and | ||||
|         # for a HEAD request, the response body is always empty so computing | ||||
|         # an accurate ETag isn't possible. | ||||
|         if request.method != "GET": | ||||
|             return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if self.needs_etag(response) and not response.has_header("ETag"): | ||||
|             set_response_etag(response) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         etag = response.get("ETag") | ||||
|         last_modified = response.get("Last-Modified") | ||||
|         last_modified = last_modified and parse_http_date_safe(last_modified) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if etag or last_modified: | ||||
|             return get_conditional_response( | ||||
|                 request, | ||||
|                 etag=etag, | ||||
|                 last_modified=last_modified, | ||||
|                 response=response, | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         return response | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def needs_etag(self, response): | ||||
|         """Return True if an ETag header should be added to response.""" | ||||
|         cache_control_headers = cc_delim_re.split(response.get("Cache-Control", "")) | ||||
|         return all(header.lower() != "no-store" for header in cache_control_headers) | ||||
| @ -0,0 +1,80 @@ | ||||
| from django.conf import settings | ||||
| from django.conf.urls.i18n import is_language_prefix_patterns_used | ||||
| from django.http import HttpResponseRedirect | ||||
| from django.urls import get_script_prefix, is_valid_path | ||||
| from django.utils import translation | ||||
| from django.utils.cache import patch_vary_headers | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class LocaleMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|     Parse a request and decide what translation object to install in the | ||||
|     current thread context. This allows pages to be dynamically translated to | ||||
|     the language the user desires (if the language is available). | ||||
|     """ | ||||
|  | ||||
|     response_redirect_class = HttpResponseRedirect | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_request(self, request): | ||||
|         urlconf = getattr(request, "urlconf", settings.ROOT_URLCONF) | ||||
|         ( | ||||
|             i18n_patterns_used, | ||||
|             prefixed_default_language, | ||||
|         ) = is_language_prefix_patterns_used(urlconf) | ||||
|         language = translation.get_language_from_request( | ||||
|             request, check_path=i18n_patterns_used | ||||
|         ) | ||||
|         language_from_path = translation.get_language_from_path(request.path_info) | ||||
|         if ( | ||||
|             not language_from_path | ||||
|             and i18n_patterns_used | ||||
|             and not prefixed_default_language | ||||
|         ): | ||||
|             language = settings.LANGUAGE_CODE | ||||
|         translation.activate(language) | ||||
|         request.LANGUAGE_CODE = translation.get_language() | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         language = translation.get_language() | ||||
|         language_from_path = translation.get_language_from_path(request.path_info) | ||||
|         urlconf = getattr(request, "urlconf", settings.ROOT_URLCONF) | ||||
|         ( | ||||
|             i18n_patterns_used, | ||||
|             prefixed_default_language, | ||||
|         ) = is_language_prefix_patterns_used(urlconf) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if ( | ||||
|             response.status_code == 404 | ||||
|             and not language_from_path | ||||
|             and i18n_patterns_used | ||||
|             and prefixed_default_language | ||||
|         ): | ||||
|             # Maybe the language code is missing in the URL? Try adding the | ||||
|             # language prefix and redirecting to that URL. | ||||
|             language_path = "/%s%s" % (language, request.path_info) | ||||
|             path_valid = is_valid_path(language_path, urlconf) | ||||
|             path_needs_slash = not path_valid and ( | ||||
|                 settings.APPEND_SLASH | ||||
|                 and not language_path.endswith("/") | ||||
|                 and is_valid_path("%s/" % language_path, urlconf) | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|  | ||||
|             if path_valid or path_needs_slash: | ||||
|                 script_prefix = get_script_prefix() | ||||
|                 # Insert language after the script prefix and before the | ||||
|                 # rest of the URL | ||||
|                 language_url = request.get_full_path( | ||||
|                     force_append_slash=path_needs_slash | ||||
|                 ).replace(script_prefix, "%s%s/" % (script_prefix, language), 1) | ||||
|                 # Redirect to the language-specific URL as detected by | ||||
|                 # get_language_from_request(). HTTP caches may cache this | ||||
|                 # redirect, so add the Vary header. | ||||
|                 redirect = self.response_redirect_class(language_url) | ||||
|                 patch_vary_headers(redirect, ("Accept-Language", "Cookie")) | ||||
|                 return redirect | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if not (i18n_patterns_used and language_from_path): | ||||
|             patch_vary_headers(response, ("Accept-Language",)) | ||||
|         response.headers.setdefault("Content-Language", language) | ||||
|         return response | ||||
| @ -0,0 +1,66 @@ | ||||
| import re | ||||
|  | ||||
| from django.conf import settings | ||||
| from django.http import HttpResponsePermanentRedirect | ||||
| from django.utils.deprecation import MiddlewareMixin | ||||
|  | ||||
|  | ||||
| class SecurityMiddleware(MiddlewareMixin): | ||||
|     def __init__(self, get_response): | ||||
|         super().__init__(get_response) | ||||
|         self.sts_seconds = settings.SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS | ||||
|         self.sts_include_subdomains = settings.SECURE_HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS | ||||
|         self.sts_preload = settings.SECURE_HSTS_PRELOAD | ||||
|         self.content_type_nosniff = settings.SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF | ||||
|         self.redirect = settings.SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT | ||||
|         self.redirect_host = settings.SECURE_SSL_HOST | ||||
|         self.redirect_exempt = [re.compile(r) for r in settings.SECURE_REDIRECT_EXEMPT] | ||||
|         self.referrer_policy = settings.SECURE_REFERRER_POLICY | ||||
|         self.cross_origin_opener_policy = settings.SECURE_CROSS_ORIGIN_OPENER_POLICY | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_request(self, request): | ||||
|         path = request.path.lstrip("/") | ||||
|         if ( | ||||
|             self.redirect | ||||
|             and not request.is_secure() | ||||
|             and not any(pattern.search(path) for pattern in self.redirect_exempt) | ||||
|         ): | ||||
|             host = self.redirect_host or request.get_host() | ||||
|             return HttpResponsePermanentRedirect( | ||||
|                 "https://%s%s" % (host, request.get_full_path()) | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|  | ||||
|     def process_response(self, request, response): | ||||
|         if ( | ||||
|             self.sts_seconds | ||||
|             and request.is_secure() | ||||
|             and "Strict-Transport-Security" not in response | ||||
|         ): | ||||
|             sts_header = "max-age=%s" % self.sts_seconds | ||||
|             if self.sts_include_subdomains: | ||||
|                 sts_header += "; includeSubDomains" | ||||
|             if self.sts_preload: | ||||
|                 sts_header += "; preload" | ||||
|             response.headers["Strict-Transport-Security"] = sts_header | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if self.content_type_nosniff: | ||||
|             response.headers.setdefault("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff") | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if self.referrer_policy: | ||||
|             # Support a comma-separated string or iterable of values to allow | ||||
|             # fallback. | ||||
|             response.headers.setdefault( | ||||
|                 "Referrer-Policy", | ||||
|                 ",".join( | ||||
|                     [v.strip() for v in self.referrer_policy.split(",")] | ||||
|                     if isinstance(self.referrer_policy, str) | ||||
|                     else self.referrer_policy | ||||
|                 ), | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|  | ||||
|         if self.cross_origin_opener_policy: | ||||
|             response.setdefault( | ||||
|                 "Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy", | ||||
|                 self.cross_origin_opener_policy, | ||||
|             ) | ||||
|         return response | ||||
		Reference in New Issue
	
	Block a user